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FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
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REPLY BRIEF ON REMEDIAL ISS E 
Plaintiff's argues that her "career objective  as to
become a partner at Price Waterhouse," that she still "wants
and is entitled to beco e a Price Waterhouse partner," that no
other available position can substitute for a Price Waterhouse
partnership an  that therefore this Court should take the
unprecedented and extraordinary step of invo ing Title VII's
remedial provisions to force Price Waterhouse to accept her as
a partner, or, alternatively, to pay her as a partner for
life. Plaintiff's Pretrial Brief on Remedy (Pi. Br.) at 1-2.
However, as discussed below, plaintiff offers neither factual







pla ntiff Has Not PemongtTfrat An Qrafii_DlEfi£tillfl
That She Be Made Partn..er.„_I _Mt £i  •
Plaintiff principally relies on the "make whole
remedial goal of Title VII to su port her argument that the
Court is authorized to order Price Waterhouse to  ake her a
Price Waterhouse partner . Se.£> S. 91   P1 • Br • at 3-4   8 & n  3 '
Plaintiff s argu ent, ho ever, is premised on a number of
erroneous assumptions.
First, plaintiff's position simply begs the question.
She assumes that the "'most co plete relief possible "-7
under Title VII includes admission into a private partnership
and then proceeds to rationalize her claim to such relief under
traditional Title VII cases involving  iscretionary
reinstatement and promotion of employees into new employment
positions. Plaintiff assiduously avoids the real legal issue
presented by this case: whether Title VII's equal employment
provisions empower courts to create nonemployment relationships
such as partnerships. That is a proposition she has not
establishe .
Second, plaintiff repeatedly suggests in the first
section of her brief that, assuming Price Waterhouse has
violated Title VII, the only way to make her "whole" is to
PI. Br. at 3 (quoting Lander v. Luian, 888 F.2d 153, 156
(D.c. Cir. 1989)) (other citations omitted).
grant her a partnership position in the Price  aterhouse firm.
PI. Br. at 3, 4, 7, 8 & n.3. However, in section II of her
brief she acknowledges that monetary relief woul  be a legally
acceptable alternative. PI. Br. at 8. Indeed, the principle
that courts should make Title VII plaintiffs "whole" by
returning the  to the position in  hich they  ould have been
absent a Title VII violation. Pi. Br. at 3, is no more than a
restatement of the common law of contract  amages.
Restate ent (Second) of Contract  § 347 & comm nt a (1981)
("Contract damages. . . are intended to give [the injured
party] the benefit of his bargain by awarding him a sum of
money that will, to the extent possible, put him in as goo  a
position as he  ould have been in had the contract been
performed.") . Contrary to plaintiffs assertions, monetary
relief, subject to rules concerning mitigation of damages, will
a equately vindicate the "make whole" remedial goal of Title
VII in partnership cases.
Third, plaintiff contends that the Supreme Court s
ecision in Hishon v. Kino & Spal ing, 467 U.S. 69 (1984),
ine orably leads to the conclusion that an order directing
Price Waterhouse to admit plaintiff as a partner is a
permissible remedy in this case. PI. Br. at 4. But plaintiff
greatly e aggerates the breadth of the Supreme Court's holding
in Hishon.
In reaching the conclusion that "in appropriate
circumstances partnership consi eration may qualify as a term,
3
condition or privilege of a person's employment," 467 U.S. at
78 n. 10 (emphasis a ded), the Court in  istoD recognised that,
as a jurisdictional matter, Title VII exten s only to "certain
aspects" of emnlovroent relationships. Ses, £ 1 , iiv at
Neither the holding nor rationale of H ten suggests that
district courts are authorised to create or otherwise regulate
a -relationship a ong partners." £fiS A -- at 79~80 <Po eU 
concurring). An  as plaintiff recognises (PI. Br. at 4), the
plaintiff in Hishen  i  not seek a mission as a partner;
therefore, the issue  hether that re e y is statutorily or
constitutionally authorised was not before the Court in that
case.17 467 U.S. at 72 (plaintiff "sought. . •
compensatory  amages 'in lieu of reinstatement and promotion to
partnership.' This, of course, negates any claim for specific
performance of the contract alleged.").
The Court in tt  n rejecte  the argu ent that the
First  mendment affirmatively protecte  the right to engage in
"•invi ious private discri ination.'" 467 U.S. at 78 (citation
omitte ). However, Price Waterhouse has  a e no such First
Amendment claim. Price Waterhouse does not contend that Title
VII's application to the partnership consi era ion process
2/ Furthermore, the district court in Histen.had granted the
efendant;s  otion to dis f  * n.2. Thus, due to the
proce ural posture Si ihe ™   nVfPowell,
present issues relating to remedy. See  L at bu n.
j., concurring).
4
violates the First Ame dment, or that partnerships have a
constitutional right to treat employees consi ered for partner
unfairly or inequitably becau e of their sex. Price Waterhouse
contends only that since -legitimate, nondiscriminatory-
concerns regar ing plaintiffs -conduct- played a significant
role in the 1983  ecision to  efer plaintiff's partnership
can idacy, and in light of the collegial, private nature of the
price Waterhouse partnership, the First Amen ment requires that
the least intrusive remedial alternative available be
chosen.4/ Chicago TMCbelS-Ucifln Huflso . U'S'
292, 303 8 n.11 (1986) ("the fact that [associational rights]
are protected by the First  mendment requires that the
procedure be carefully tailored to minimize the infringement-).
Finally, plaintiff acknowledges that "(tlhis is the
first partnership case to go to the merits,- but maintains that
-the remedial issues are no different in principle or in
difficulty from those in other cases already decided.- PI. Br.
at 6. But the cases relied upon by plaintiff are different in
kind than the case at bar. Although, as plaintiff correctly
observes, academic tenure decisions may result in a -lifetime-
2/ HPEkinS v. Price_WAt£Xhfi SS  618 F. Supp. 1109, 1115
(D.D.C. 1985).
The  c gnized  p f fa nuff
partner 1 H ?he o   inds liability it could order Prrce
5
relationship bet een a professor and a university,
reinstatement and promotion of a professor to a tenured
position creates no more than a long-term fimElsyment
relationship. Indeed, in 1972 Congress specifically a ende 
Title VII,  ithout reme ial qualification, to eliminate the
statutory exemption for e ucational institutions, in part to
eradicate discrimination in te ure decisions an  to ensure that
women an  minorities were promoted to tenured aca emic
employment positions on a nondiscriminatory basis. See
nnivprsi v of EeMUglsania V. EEO£, U.S. NO. 88-493, slip op.
at 6, 58 U.S.L.W. 4093, 4096 (Jan. 9, 1990)Such clear
evi ence of Congress' intent is manifestly absent  ith respect
to the remedial authority of courts to order firms to bestow
partnership status on former employees.
Moreover, "(c]ourts have quite rarely awar e  tenure
as a reme y for unlawful  iscrimination. ..." Brcjwn v.
T n P.PS of Boston Unjvfissitx, 51 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
/ plaintiff states that the Supreme Court in the Universit 
of Pennsylvania case  f? e g sr® ereTitle VII " PI. Br. at
partnerships engoy speci out of a single sentence in
the Court s op nion in that case. The Court, in  icta simply
suaaested that partnerships, like universities, are not
suggested t P . , priviiege to  ithhold partnership
SiiSe wiS SiUr I. f om production in response to an
IIS? ISbpoena. Gi en that the
partnership consi eration process subiect to Title v 
scrutiny, this should come as no surprise.
6
815, 835 (1st Cir. 1989).fe/ And those few ca es, relied upon
by plaintiff, are inapposite.
For example, in K ndA v. B t finlierg CelleSe. 621 F.2 
532 (3d Cir. 1980), the Third Circuit pointedly emphasised that
the district court "did not sward [plaintiff] tenure," ijL at
549 (emphasis in original), but rather gave her the opportunity
to obtain the only necessary qualification for tenure that she
i o r i v . in Brown v. Truste s Qf
lacked (a masters  egree). Si ilarly, m  
er    E  a n T tTrnr  1?£3C# C3S» 3fc 8 3 5 *  3 V f
Rngfon UniY itY  SU£ra  51 Fair Emp. Frac.
the court affirme  a tenure order but emphasized that
plaintiffs -near unanimous endorsement by colleagues. . .
suggest ] strongly that Wfiifi Mfi ne iss es a£ ceUsaislitl er
the like which might Esks the grantina ei ieEuia
. r.annmnriate ¦ JA  at 837 (emphasis ad ed). Brewn is
therefore clearly distinguishable from this case - plaintiff
has been found to have had serious and -considerable-
colleqiality proble s both before and after the 1983 hol 
_ viatro r fused to grant tenure as often as they
/ Courts cases ha Fields v. Clark UniveristY, 40
have ordered lfc* (D. Mass. 1986) ("Because
Fair Emp. Prac. "a t- al Questions as to the plaintiff s
the record raises substa   impose her services upon
capacity « a teacher, J life. What she is
the university for the re opportunity to have the
entitled to, in my opinio , . roerits without being
issue of her tenure aete™?,"e   rated m dthdi
discri inated against on t ijs?)• ss£ also R rmankin v.
ei7,s f  in5 1125-26 Id Cit it i). ggri.  u iu .mstanzo. 626 F. 2  1110, rizp v
450 U.S. 923 (1981).
7 /
decision at issue in this litigation.- Eefi,
Defen ant's Pre-Trial Brief On Reme ial Issues ( Def. Br.-) at
9-14.
Plaintiffs reliance (PI. Br. at 3-4, 7-8) on Ban er
V. Luiaa. 888 F.2d 153 (D.C. cir. 1989), is similarly
misplace . The reinstatement an  promotion of a fe eral civil
service employee falls squarely within the juris ictional
strictures of Title VII. An  compelling a federal or state
governmental entity to rehire an employee simply does not
involve an intrusion into a private association an  therefore
does not implicate associational rights protecte  by the First
Amendment.
CF Mac Failp  TO pprnnn g ra e Tha  Tho COd -t
2 . Plaint  ff Has ta -e,   • rin To Make Her_A 
shrml  F  rcise Eouitanie uiscie  ui 
Partner 
As Price Waterhouse  emonstrated in its initial brief
on remedial issues (Def. Br. at 9-14), even if the Court has
.npxii  to  ake plaintiff a partner, such relief would be
inappropriate because of the interpersonal s ills deficiencres
that plaintiff  anifeste  at Price Waterhouse. Moreover, Price
Waterhouse has argued that plaintiff's conduct after the 1983
a. cited by plaintiff/ I dtd v•   idLS.*
7/ The other tenure case citea cy   46g u.S. 1216
741 F. 2  838 (6th Cir 1984) the court
(1985), IS also  istinguishab . intruding unduiy into the
voiced serious reservat s o made tenure automatid
after6fiveCyearsUteachingSexperience at a university, the court
affirmed the trial court's tenure order.
8
hold  ecision - in particular, her misrepresentations to a
partner in her practice group - precludes the re e y o£
artnership a mission. De£. Br. at 9.
Plaintiff ignores these issues. She suggests (PI. Br.
at 9-10) that the only impediment to this Court's ordering her
admission as a partner is "ill will" cause  by this
litigation.  However, plaintiffs self-acknowle ged
interpersonal skills deficiencies were  anife ted long before
plaintiff filed this lawsuit. It is this aspect of the case,
coupled with the sensitive nature of a partnershi  position,
that  ake  specific relief particularly inappropriate. See,
B. .. Mclntesh V. James Tr ck Lines, 767 F.2d 433, 435 s. n.l
(8th Cir. 1985) (plaintif s own proble s precluded
reinstatement).
Nonetheless, plaintiff argues that "a mitting
plaintiff to partnership flows naturally from a finding of
liability. . . •• PI. Br• at 1-2. In describing this -natural
is a frequent by-product of employment drscn inatron
position. Id- at 473  20 F. Supp. 919,
QQm tW  nY  1976 * e f  -wfi Qui epiBion» 559 F. 2d 1203
926-27 (S.D.N.Y. 19 ), a-  on (1977) (noting that
(2d Cir.), Cfilt:,?®111??'! s ilnerally not a sufficient reason
litigation had  ndermined  utual trust and confidence of
plaintiff and defendant).
9
flow," plaintiff contends that, if the Court finds Price
Waterhouse liable to plaintiff, it has conclu e  that
discriminatory factors were a "but for" cause of the  eferral
of plaintiffs partnership can idacy, an  that this "mean[s]
that  iscrimination base  on sex was the reason plaintiff  as
place  on hold. ..." Therefore, according to plaintiff, the
"natural remedy" is to require admission of plaintiff as a
partner. PI. Br. at 3.
Plaintiff s suggestion that a liability fin ing  eans
that se  discrimination was the sol£ cause of the 1983 decision
to place plaintiff's partnership candidacy on hold is flatly
incorrect. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s plurality opinion
explicitly recognized that "mi ed  otive" cases like this one
fey d finition involve multiple causal factors. See ?TXS&
waferhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1785 (1989). Although
the liability frame ork adopte  by the plurality might warrant
requiring the  efendant to show the absence of "but for"
causation to avoid liability, see at 1790, a liability
fin ing  eans nothing more than that a  iscriminatory factor
as fine of the causes of the challenged employ ent
decision.1  See W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, D. Owen,
Prns  r & on On Tort£ § 41, at 266 (5th e . 1984)
("instructions to the jury that they must find the defen ant’s
o/ In other  ords, it simply means that the defendant has
f ileS ?o prove th  the decision would have been the same m
the absence of discrimination.
10
conduct to be 'the sole cause* or 'the dominant cause* of the
injury are rightly condemed as  isleading"); F. Harper, F.
James h 0. Gray, The Law Qf.Tor , § 20.2, at 91 (2  ed. 1986)
("Clearly this is not a quest for a ££i£ cause ... it is
enough that  efendant's negligence be a cause in fact of the
. . . .  
harm.") (emphasis m original .
Price Waterhouse submits that the record in this case
demonstrates that plaintiffs "considerable problems  ealing
with staff and peers," 618 F. Supp. at 1114, standing alone,
oul  have led Price Waterhouse to make the same decision to
efer her partnership candidacy. If this Court agrees, then
Price Waterhouse is not liable un er Title VII. However, even
if the Court finds against Price Waterhouse on the issue of
liability, that does not alter the fact that plaintiff s
self-acknowledged interpersonal skills deficiencies  ere an 
continue to be a serious and substantial impediment to her
becoming a partner at Price Waterhouse.
3 > Plaintif s Clai s for Monetary Relief Are Gros ly
inflated.
The issue in this case is whether Price Waterhouse's
decision in 1983 to defer plaintiff's partnership candidacy for
10/ The "but for" causation principle is drawn from common
tSrt law doctrine, which generally regards it is as only a
threshold predicate to a determination of liability.
s ct at 1807 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). A tort piaintiff not
only  ust prove that the defendant's conduct was one of the
III fol- causalfactors, but also  hat it was the prozrmate
cause of the plaintiff ' s injury. I   »¦
11
one year violated Title VII. This Court has previously found
that the decision of plaintiffs practice grou  not to
for partner the next year was
repropose plaintitt ror.p
• • indeed was a result of plaintiff s own
non iscrxminatory ana, indeea,
_ COT? ciioo at 1115. Plaintiff di  not appeal
conduct. Se£ 618 F. Supp. ac
these findings.
Plaintiff'S claims for monetary relief for the  erio 
July 1. 1983 "to her life expectancy in 2025- must therefore be
rejecte . A finding of liability would mean, at most, that
imper issible discriminatory conduct in 1963 contributed to a
one-year delay of plaintiff's partnership candi acy. Her
monetary relief should therefore be limited to back pay for the
period July 1, 1983 to June 30, 1984. See Def. Er. at 15-23.
plaintiff has, for obvious reasons, based her damage
calculations on the assumption that the 1983 decision to place
her candidacy on hold was a rejection of her candidacy that
ended her chance to become a Price Waterhouse partner.
However, even assuming aiguenfla that this is true - which it
is not   plaintiff's request for  onetary relief must fail.
Plaintiff attempts to justify her claim for  2 years
of compensation, including retirement benefits,  by
comparing her case to that of an age discrimination plaintiff
11/ It should be noted that Price wa °use;=!ar ea partner
retirement plans are unfunde an  unv  re ireIrien{. 8ge, that
partner*"forfeits all future rights to retirement benefits.
12
who "has no reasonable prospect of obtaining future
[comparable] employment elsewhere" before retirement. Ees PI-
Br. at 9-10. This analogy demonstrates the fundamental flaw in
plaintiffs  ethodology: While arguably it  ight be reasonable
and appropriate to award compensation until retire ent age to
an employee who, absent discrimination, otherwise would have
retired in the near future, the sa e cannot be said for an
em loyee, such as plaintiff, who voluntarily resigns fro  the
employer iMS before her projected retirement  ate. See
navis v. Combustion Fngineerinq, ms , 7 2 F.2d 916,  23 (6th
Cir. 198 ) ( istinguishing between a 41 year old e ployee and a
63 year old employee for purposes of awarding front pay "until
such ti e as he qualifies for a pension").
in ad ition, plaintif s failure to exercise
reasonable diligence in seeking suitable employment after she
resigned from Price Waterhouse significantly li its her
asserted right to monetary relief. Plaintiff states that,
after she voluntarily resigned from Price Waterhouse in 1984,
she "reasonably believe  that the only place sh   ight be able
to obtain an opportunity comparable to that available at Price
Waterhouse. . . was with another Big 8 firm." PI. Br. at 12.
Not only was this assumption wholly unjustifie  and erroneous,
but plaintiff by her own admission  id little if anything to
test its accuracy. Such conduct  as unreasonable and does not
satisfy the duty to mitigate. See Hayes v. Shelby Memoria 





(11th Cir. 1984) (back pay award
unreasonably assumed that effo ts
fut-i because of her pregnancy).
reduce  where
to obtain employment
Further ore, having assume  that the only
"substantially equivalent" positions available existed at other
-Big 8" accounting fir s, plaintiff contacte  only sms. such
firm. PI. Br. at 14; see, e. g, 1989 Hopkins Dep. at 205. Far
from going to "heroic lengths" (PI. Br. at 14), plai tiff
har ly made any effort at all to obtain the kin  of position
that she perceived (incorrectly) to be the sole substitute for
a Price Waterhouse partnership. Instead, plaintiff "almost as
soon as she left defendant" (Pi. Br. at 13)  ecided to form her
own consulting company, and in 1988, became an employee at the
World Bank. Ha  plaintiff genuinely attempted to fin  a
position similar to the one she sought at Price Waterhouse, and
failed, plaintiff may well have been justified in lowering her
sights" / to include self-employment or employment in a
position with much lower earning potential than a Price
Waterhouse partnership. Plaintiff, however, lowere  her sights
too quickly and too far. She clearly  id not  ake a reasonable
effort to obtain the kind of position that woul  have resulted
in the monetary rewar  she now seeks from Price Waterhouse.




Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that an order
irecting that she be made a Price Waterhouse partner is either
authorized or appropriate. Her efforts to mitigate damages
were unreasonable and insufficient as a matter of law.
Therefore, plaintiff s relief, if she is entitled to any at
all, must be limited to back pay for the period between the
time of the deferral of her partnership candidacy in 1983 and
the date when she couId have attained a position similar to a
Price Waterhouse partnership had she taken reasonable steps to
obtain such a position.
Dated: January 24, 1990 Respectfully submitted,
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER
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